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THE INITIATIVE ON QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS  
 
The George Washington University’s Center for Law, Economics and Finance 
(C-LEAF) has launched an Initiative on Quality Shareholders, under the 
direction of Lawrence A. Cunningham. It is intended to research and report on 
an unexplored force in contemporary corporate America: the traditional investor 
that studies individual companies, acquires substantial stakes in few, holds 
them for the long-term, and is available as needed to engage with management.   
 
In contrast to this vanishing breed, dubbed by Warren Buffett “high quality 
shareholders,” today's shareholder bases are dominated by: (1) index funds, 
which buy all companies in a market basket without focusing on any of them; 
(2) transients, which may buy large stakes in given companies but never hold 
for long; and (3) activists, whose small stakes are amplified by rapid-fire, high-
profile campaigns for immediate corporate change.   
 
The Initiative explores the advantages and disadvantages various types of 
shareholders present to individual companies and corporate America taken as 
a whole. In particular, the goal of the Initiative is to explain why a substantial 
cohort of quality shareholders is a valuable asset and how policies and practices 
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THIS PUBLICATION  
 
This publication, an occasional paper, highlights research generated by the 
Initiative on Quality Shareholders (QSs) under the direction of Lawrence A. 
Cunningham of George Washington University. It outlines the program’s 
framework and summarizes key empirical findings.    
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I. SHAREHOLDERS AND PERFORMANCE 
 
 The growing size and power of institutional investors is among the most important 
contemporary trends in American corporate life. In recent years, their rise has drawn 
special attention to shareholder activists on the one hand and passive index funds on the 
other. Lively debates address whether such powerful investors have the right vision or 
conviction to faithfully discharge the trust so many Americans have placed in them.  
 On vision, for two decades participants have debated whether investors, especially 
activists, are too short-term oriented for markets and managers to maintain a long-term 
view. On conviction, just in the past two years debaters began to ask whether certain 
kinds of investors, particularly passive indexers, have sufficient incentives to actively 
monitor managers to assure performance and hold them accountable.    
 These are vital discussions in corporate America, implicating fundamental 
questions of the balance of power between directors and shareholders as well as among 
shareholders. As such, they stoke numerous sub-debates on every aspect of corporate 
governance, such as board structures, director-officer relationships, shareholder rights, 
and corporate purpose—all with wide-ranging effects on the national economy. 
 Although such debates are sophisticated, increasingly data-driven, and involve 
overlapping participants, a myopic binary characterizes the debates and their 
implications. The horizon debate juxtaposes short-term against long-term visions but 
mutes the issue of conviction, while the conviction debate juxtaposes passive against 
active investment styles while muting the issue of horizon. In fact, however, while time 
horizon and relative conviction are vital, neither taken alone captures the nuanced reality 
of investor behavior which calls for examining both features simultaneously.  
 The recent initiative directed by Lawrence A. Cunningham undertaken at George 
Washington University incorporates such concurrent analysis of horizon and conviction 
into these debates. By switching from binary conceptions to one that combines both 
attributes, analysis permits recognizing another cohort of shareholders overlooked in 
prevailing debates: long-term concentrated shareholders.  Dubbed “high quality 




 While contemporary data suggest that a large plurality of institutional shareholders 
qualify as short-term and another plurality as indexers, the long-term concentrated cohort 
remains a significant force in market and corporate behavior. It should accordingly be 
given an important place in debates over horizon and conviction—as well as all areas 
concerning shareholder voice.  
A. Shareholder Quadrants 
 This research first delineates multiple shareholder types based on both horizon 
and conviction.  To visualize this, shareholder cohorts can be identified using a 2 x 2 
diagram arraying investment conviction across the top and investment horizon down the 





INVESTMENT CONVICTION  
    Lower Higher 
INVESTMENT  
HORIZON 
Shorter Transients   Activists   
Longer Indexers   Quality   
  
 To animate the approach, descriptive names are assigned: transients to shorter-
term/diversifiers; indexers to longer-term diversifiers; activists to shorter-term 
concentrators; and quality to longer-term concentrators. Investment conviction is 
measured by the degree of an investor’s portfolio diversification versus concentration, 
with lower conviction meaning the most diversified portfolio—epitomized by index funds. 





 Delineating the different criteria enables consideration of the trade-offs. That will 
help managers attract shareholders they desire and policymakers tailor public policy, in 
each case ideally towards long-term and informed investors.     
  The stakes are high, as these debates touch fundamental issues in corporate 
governance. The rise of institutional investors raised the volume of shareholder voices on 
a wide range of matters, from director elections to say on executive pay and influence on 
corporate proposals spanning from climate change and gender diversity to strategic 
direction and corporate priorities.    
B. QS Out-Performance 
 For nearly two decades, debate has raged around whether stock indexing or stock 
picking is a superior strategy, often delineating further into types of broad indexes (by 
size, sector, or geography) with stock pickers competing against that benchmark.1 A 
foundational contribution to that debate is a 1997 article by Mark Carhart, then a professor 
of finance at the University of Southern California, finding no evidence of successful 
mutual fund stock pickers.2  
 Ensuing research contributed to what became conventional wisdom, such as: 
average active funds underperform the market after fees;3 top fund performance doesn’t 
persist;4 and, while some managers are skilled, few deliver on that value for customers 
after fees.5 Yet debate continues—and Buffett won a famous bet siding with indexers over 
hedge funds—at least those charging particularly high fees.6 Multiple editions of best-
selling books continue to showcase dueling philosophies in academia: University of 
Pennsylvania finance professor Jeremy Siegel has repeatedly shown that buy-and-hold 
works,7 while Princeton University finance professor Burton Malkiel continues to release 
new editions of the book that legitimized indexing as a strategy.8  
But changes in shareholder demographics during the past two decades, combined 
with increased competition and lower fees, produced a new strand of research 
challenging these conventional views. For instance, there is evidence that the average 
active fund does outperform an equivalent index;9 some top-performance records do 
persist;10 and a sizable cohort of managers with particular traits demonstrate skill that 




suggests in his comprehensive review of contemporary research, among those traits are 
conviction and patience.12 Those are the defining traits of QSs. 
C. QS Attractor Out-Performance  
 It also appears to be the case that the companies in which QSs invest the most 
tend to outperform as well.  For instance, C-LEAF’s database ranks a large sample 
(n=2070) of large companies according to their propensity to attract a high density of QS. 
We compared two portfolios over the study period 
(2014-2018): one comprised of the 25 companies 
attracting the highest density of QSs and the other 
of the 25 attracting the lowest density of QS.  The 
high QS density portfolio outperformed the low QS 
density portfolio in each of those five years.   
 Performance is measured as the cumulative return, or total change in the price of 
the investment expressed as a percentage, on daily unadjusted historical closing prices 
from the first trading day in 2014 through the last trading day of 2018.   
 
This sample accords with anecdotal evidence and we continue to expand the 
testing using this database to test for robustness. For instance, consider the relative 
performance of the top 69 in QS density on that list. Those with higher QS density tend 







1/2/2014 1/2/2015 1/2/2016 1/2/2017 1/2/2018
Portfolio Performance of Top 25 and Bottom 25 
(1/2/2014 - 12/31/2018) 
TOP25 BOTTOM25
  
Year TOP 25 BOTTOM 25 
2014 17%    9% 
2015  8% -16% 
2016 18%  13% 
2017 19%   8% 




distribution of QS attractors over the 10-year period from 2010 through mid-2020. For 
comparison, during that period, the cumulative return of the S&P 500 was 181.9% and of 
the Russell 3000 180.73%. In the following chart, such performance places both indices 
in the 100–200% performance band (red bar). Of the top 69 QS attractors, sixty percent 
(41) outperformed while forty percent (28) underperformed.  
 
 
 A hypothetical portfolio only with the top 69 QS attractors, each company given 
equal weights, outperformed the S&P 500 by approximately 200%.  
 

























































# of QS 
Attractors 
< 0% 2 
0 - 100% 9 
100 - 200% 19 
200 - 300% 10 
300 - 400% 8 
400 - 500% 3 




 Why might companies with higher densities of QSs perform better than rivals with 
lower-quality shareholder bases? Superior economics and related performance would 
certainly attract such shareholders, so that high QS density is a consequence rather than 
a cause of such a correlation. But it also seems plausible that the existence of a high 
density of QSs confers a variety of competitive advantages on corporations that help 
explain such superiority. For instance, QSs give managers longer time horizons to 
execute on strategy than transients; cast more informed shareholder votes than indexers 
that may add value; and pursue engagement with managers that is more productive and 
patient than activists, including providing a brain trust to draw upon for board service and 
consultation.   
II. IDENTIFYING QSS AND THEIR ATTRACTORS 
 
 In order to segment shareholders into these cohorts, it is necessary to apply both  
quantitative and qualitative analysis.   While elements of judgment and assumptions are 
required, they are supported by the data. We are reminded of the quip of noted quality 
management expert, W. Edwards Deming: “Without data, you are just another person 
with an opinion.”  
 The adage attributed to John Maynard Keynes is also apt: it is better to be 
approximately right than precisely wrong. This wisdom applies to any attempt to identify 
the QSs from among today’s vast universe of institutional investors. Reliable selections 
depend on both objective criteria and subjective calls.  The following is a summary of the 
approaches used in this research. 
  The primary selection criteria for this research are as follows: (1) QSs are 
shareholders that historically, over a multi-year period, have exhibited a consistent 
behavior of investing in high concentrations and for long holding periods; and (2) 
companies whose shareholder base is comprised of a high relative density of such 
shareholders. 
 Creating criteria to quantify shareholder cohorts raises challenges, like between 
what’s short- and long-term and what’s a diversified versus concentrated portfolio. While 
there are QSs under the tightest definitions of long-term and concentrated—say average 




so prone to both trading and indexing that the pool tails off quickly. To some, plausible 
criteria for quality might be as little as a 2-year holding period and 200 or fewer stocks.  
 Some large financial institutions might be classified in one category but have 
multiple funds within them better classified in another.  For example, Neuberger Berman 
as a firm in aggregate shows an index level of concentration yet offers many investors a 
selection of funds with managers who certainly count as QSs. Each fund within a family 
may warrant separate evaluation.  
 Also warranting separate evaluation are shareholders not required to publicly 
disclose their positions, unlike large institutions. These are individuals or small firms who 
shun the ubiquitous mutual funds in favor of selecting their own portfolio. They are clearly 
not indexers, though the exact distribution as transient versus QSs is hard to determine 
and may vary with different companies. One thing is clear: despite the rise of institutional 
equity ownership in recent decades, individuals and families still own one-third of 
corporate equity—a formidable cohort.  
 Some shareholders are QSs to one company while being another’s indexer or 
transient: some shareholders may have a huge stake in one favored company held 
forever while the rest of the portfolio is either indexed or traded rapidly. For instance, First 
Manhattan is undoubtedly a QS of Berkshire Hathaway (at least 25% of its recent 
portfolio, since 1966) but not, say, a QS of Hostess Brands (it recently bought and sold a 
small stake within 3 quarters). Likewise, even Numeric, an exquisite transient, has 2.5% 
of its portfolio in Facebook held since its 2012 IPO.  
A. Multiple Research Methods   
 
 Numerous informal proxies and formal research methods may be used to identify 
quality shareholders. The following is a survey and summary. 
 Surveys.  One way to identify QSs, in general or at particular companies, is to 
survey leading investors. A similar method for identifying companies that succeed in 
attracting quality shareholders would survey investor relations professionals with 
analogous knowledge. The latter is an obvious winner for companies undertaking such 




 The survey approach is endorsed in several prominent writings by and about 
outstanding investors, heavily oriented toward QSs. Examples include the celebrated 
1984 Buffett article, Superinvestors of Graham and Doddsville, and a 2005 sequel by 
Columbia University law professor Louis Lowenstein—along with a comment on the latter 
by Seth Klarman of Baupost Group, as well as well as numerous other books profiling 
outstanding investors.13 Such research yields the following exemplars:   
Brave Warrior 
Chieftain 






J. M. Keynes 
Charles Munger 






 Berkshire Based. Given Warren Buffett’s successful 50-year effort to attract QSs 
to Berkshire Hathaway, that company’s shareholder list is a good place to find QSs. Start 
with the most concentrated Berkshire shareholders—there are at least 250 with more 
than 5% of their portfolio staked in the company, almost all of which have held the stock 
for decades.  
To make the search manageable and meaningful, select an appropriate sample or 
investment size, such as the 20 with the largest stakes or all those whose stakes exceed 
$250 million. Examine their portfolios to identify other companies they concentrate in for 
long periods. Finally, examine those companies to identify other concentrated long-term 
shareholders. The result will be a credible group of both QSs and companies who attract 
them. Examples of concentrated and substantial long-term Berkshire shareholders: 
 Akre Capital 
 Check Capital 
 Consulta 
 Cortland Advisers 
 Davis Selected Advisers 
 Douglass Winthrop 








 Lee Danner & Bass 
 Lourd Capital 
 Markel 
 Mar Vista 
 Ruane Cunniff  
 Wedgewood Partners 
 Weitz Investment 
 









Fairfax Financial  











    Existing Research.  An additional resource is published empirical research. The 
methods can be adapted to suit particular companies, by features such as size or industry. 
Such research rarely lists particular shareholders by type, rather analyzing aggregate 
data to address broader questions. But there are exceptions, such as a table of both QSs 
and transients in recent research about their different effects on given company risk 
profiles and market pricing.14 The following chart presents each type alphabetically.  
  
Among Top Quality Among Top Transients 
Berkshire Hathaway 
Capital Research & Management 
Jennison Associates 
Fidelity Management & Research  
Harris Associates (Oakmark Funds) 
State Farm 










Leading researchers Cremers and Pareek created a 13F-based data set of all institutional 
investors dating to 1980, presenting, quarter-by-quarter, each shareholder’s 
concentration (measured as deviation from the index, with the index equal to 0.0) and 
average holding period. In this massive data base, the cutoff for the top quintiles were 0.9 
for concentration and 2.0 years for holding periods.15 From the top quartile of both—
excluding foundations and private equity funds holding one or a few stocks—choose a 
relevant time period, such as the most recent five-years, omit duplicate names, and rank 
the remaining names by frequency of quarters making the list. Doing so yielded a total of 
195 names, a rich vein of QSs. There was substantial overlap in this cohort with that 
identified using the other methods. Selected additional names follow (alphabetically): 
 
Allen Holding 
Bislett Mgmt.  











W. H. Reaves 





 Resources. Several website services provide useful data. Rocket Financial digests 
quarterly-updated 13F filings. The site presents shareholder lists and investor portfolios 




spreadsheets for further manipulation, including calculating concentration. The site 
tabulates quarterly filings over time to enable calculating holding periods as well.  
 The FloatSpec website was made available to Initiative researchers during its 
incubation and before its developers sold it to PJT Partners. Enter company or fund 
names and the site presents brief profiles along with rankings, such as fund turnover and 
certain categories of shareholder type. One extract ranked shareholders by a combination 
of their quartile rankings in terms of turnover and concentration.  There was substantial 
overlap in this cohort with that identified using both the Berkshire method and the 




Beck, Mack & Oliver 
Broad Run 
Brown Brothers Harriman 
Burgundy 





Lee, Danner & Bass 






 Trading Data. To proxy companies boasting patient shareholders, consider data 
relating either share trading volume to shares outstanding or dollar trading volume to 
market capitalization.  We did the latter using S&P Capital IQ data. We ran it for both 
smaller groups such as the S&P 500, larger groupings such as the Russell 3000, and 
even larger universes encompassing substantially all publicly traded companies. We 
examined results on different timelines, one, three, and five years. These are the forty 
companies from the S&P 500 with the lowest share turnover for the one-year period 
ending with the third quarter of 2018 (in order down the columns then across the rows).  
Berkshire Hathaway  
Alphabet (Google) 
BlackRock 
Johnson & Johnson 
The Coca-Cola Co. 
Walmart  




PNC Financial  
Air Products  
Procter & Gamble  
Charles Schwab  
Stryker  
Northrop Grumman  
Wells Fargo  
American Express  
Union Pacific  











General Dynamics  
Marsh & McLennan  
PPG Industries 
Lockheed Martin  
Bristol-Myers Squibb  
Microsoft  







From among the Russell 3000, the following selected names appeared in the top quintile 













Cimpress   
 
 Empirical Data Analytics. In empirical research of this Initiative, we identified those 
institutional investors with the highest conviction in their positions and greatest patience, 
using a multi-factor ranking model, and identified some of the companies in which that 
cohort most often invested.  We examined the 20F filings of institutional investors 
registered/operating in the U.S. and/or Canada which made quarterly reporting during all 
quarters from 2014 to 2018, had a minimum $1.1B AUM,16 and a majority of whose 
investments were in corporate equity. We removed avowed indexers, activists, and 
private equity.   
 Concerning conviction, the model analyzed such factors as: (1) the percentage 
weight of a stock in the portfolio; (2) relative concentration levels of the portfolio; (3) 
average voting power of the portfolio in the companies of the stocks it holds; (4) number 
of stocks in the portfolio with significant ownership (>0.1% of market cap); and (5) total 
number of stocks in the portfolio. Relative patience was probed by such factors as: (1) 
the portfolio’s gross traded dollar-value compared to its AUM and (2) the rate and 
magnitude of change of a portfolio’s constituents, calculated by taking the periodic 
standard deviation and overall standard deviation of stocks in a portfolio.   
 The top 20 QSs are as follows (in order, down columns and across rows): 
Berkshire Hathaway 
Gates Foundation 

















Irdian Asset Management 
 
 Among portfolio positions representing at least 2% of each such QS’s portfolio, 
300 different stocks appeared.  Of these, 20 appeared thrice or more as listed below and 





























S&P Global  











Nine Times  
Alphabet 
    
 We also ranked a large sampling (2,070) of companies based on the extent to which their 
institutional investor base exhibits the traits of QSs, in terms of time-horizon and 
concentration, called the QS Density Ranking (QSDR).  The QSDR is a proxy of the 
degree to which companies attract a high density of QSs. It can be used to understand 
which corporate policies and practices are associated with a high density of QS. 
The QSDR can also be used to position companies boasting ownership by a 
particular QS in the context of the broader QS cohort. For instance, consider relating the 
foregoing list of companies in which the top 20 QSs tend to invest to the QSDR.    All 
eight held four or more times are in the top half of the QSDR; among those held thrice 
nearly half (5/11) are in the top quarter (Allergan is not in the QSDR); and 64% (7/11) are 
in the top quarter.  In the random sampling of those represented twice, 58% (7/12) are in 
the top quarter while 75% (9/12) are in the top half.  Such figures suggest that when 
leading QSs invest significantly in a particular company, it is likely that a larger cohort of 
QS accompanies them. 
Following is an aggregation of some of the leading names of QSs and their 
investees. These lists include many of those highlighted in the boxes above along with, 
for further illustration, others seen in the research we have summarized.  
  
B. Sampling of Names 
QS Firms 
AKO Capital 
Akre Capital   
Ariel Investments 
Aristotle Capital  
Artisan Partners 
Atlanta Investment  
Avenir Corp.  





Beck, Mack & Oliver 
Blue Harbour 
Broad Run 










Dodge & Cox 
Douglass Winthrop 




First Manhattan  
First Pacific  
Franklin Mutual 
Gardner Russo  
Giverny Capital  
Fundsmith  
Harris Assoc. (Oakmark) 
Hartford Funds  
Hotchkiss & Wiley 
Irdian Asset Mgmt. 
Jackson National Asset  
Kahn Brothers 
Kensico Capital 
Klingenstein Fields  
Lafayette Investments 
Lee, Danner & Bass 
London Co. of Virginia 
Longview Partners 









Mraz, Amerine  
Neuberger Berman 
Polen Capital 
Ruane Cunniff  
Scopia Capital 
Sleep, Zakaria  
Smead Capital         
Southeastern Asset Mgmt. 
Speece Thorson 
Sprucegrove 
State Farm Insurance  
Stockbridge Partners 
T. Rowe Price 
Temasek Holdings 
Tweedy Browne  
W. H. Reaves 
Wallace Capital 
Water Street Capital  
Wedgewood Partners   






























Graham Holdings (WaPo) 
Hormel Foods 
Illinois Tool Works 
Intel 
Johnson & Johnson 
Kimberly Clark 
Liberty Media  
Loews  
Markel  






























III. QUALITY SHAREHOLDER STATEMENTS 
 
QSs routinely publish statements about what they are looking for in their investments. 
Managers writing corporate menus should consider these statements of shareholder 
appetite in serving up their offerings.  A large sampling appears in an appendix to 
Cunningham’s book, Quality Shareholders. A taste from that follows. 
 
Cedar Rock Capital Partners 
Our investment approach is to buy and hold shares in companies that we believe 
capable of compounding in value over the long term. Our investment criteria emphasize 
quality, value and managerial character. We define high-quality businesses as being 
capable of sustaining high returns on their operating capital employed without requiring 
financial leverage, and of reinvesting at least a portion of their excess cash flows at 
high rates of return. We consider such companies to be attractively valued when their 
normalized excess cash flows, calculated as a percentage of the companies’ equity 
market capitalizations, compare favorably with long-term interest rates. 
We devote much of our research effort to assessing corporate managers for their 
probity, trustworthiness and ability to reinvest their corporate cash flows at attractive 
rates of returns for shareholders. Our criteria are demanding and our portfolios tend to 
be concentrated in approximately 20 companies, selected globally. We make no effort 
to minimize volatility relative to any national, regional or global index of equity market 
performance. However, we expect our emphasis on both quality and value to generate 
satisfactory absolute and relative performance over the long term. 
 
Gardner, Russo & Gardner 
To merit our investing attention a company must possess unique characteristics. 
Its businesses’ competitive advantages must give indication of stability and growth. This 
is measured by its sustainable long-term returns on capital and by consistent 
generation of free cash flow. The company must be run by a management team with a 
proven record of successful operation and effective allocation of free cash flow.  
 It must also possess the type of firm culture that provides the context and 
incentive for long-term value creation. This means a management that brings the most 
effective of “family-owned” approaches to running their operations (long-term wealth-
building rather than short-term profit-harvesting; interest in proactively maintaining 
reputational value of a business; deep knowledge of its businesses and of the industry 
in which its businesses operate).  
  We look to invest in companies which have the “capacity to reinvest” that are 
run by shareholder-minded managements who have the “capacity to suffer” Wall Street 
disapproval while directing heavy investments intended to generate future growth but 
which all-too-often adversely impact near-term reported profits.  
 
Southeastern Asset Management  
 We invest in strong businesses that are understandable, financially sound, 
competitively positioned, and have ample free cash flow that may grow over time. 




operators and capital allocators, who are focused on building value per share and have 
incentives aligned with their shareholders.   
 We seek to take advantage of short-term market emotions. We are long-term 
owners, not traders or speculators, and invest for the long-term based on objective 
intrinsic values with a horizon of at least five years. 
 We construct our portfolios with what we believe to be our best 18-22 global 
investment ideas. Concentrating allows for adequate diversification while providing 
some of the best opportunities to maximize returns, and minimize loss of principal. 
 Our investment team views our portfolio company management teams and 
boards of directors as partners, and we engage with them to ensure the greatest value 
for shareholders over the long term. 
 
IV. SUCCESSFUL CORPORATE POLICIES AND PRACTICES 
 
  Companies can use a variety of strategies of shareholder engagement to attract 
QSs. Several seem obvious yet are surprisingly overlooked; others may involve a more 
conscientious commitment.  Among easy steps any company can take at low cost but few 
do: corporate mission statements, annual shareholder letters, and annual shareholder 
meetings.  All three are staples of corporate life. Yet many managers see these 
engagement features as mere incantation, ritual, or regulatory mandate, respectively; 
they are ignored by virtually all indexers, most transients, and some activists. But savvy 
managers appreciate them as fruitful vehicles to engage QS. These managers 
encapsulate the corporate personality in a mission statement; share insights on 
challenges with a thoughtful annal letter; and reflect on both mission and challenges 
together at an engaging annual meeting.  
 Among strategies requiring greater commitment is bucking the tide to abstain from 
quarterly earnings guidance and conference calls in favor of a longer-term focus. By 
stopping this habit and breaking the cycle, managers will disappoint transients and attract 
QSs. A related step is to adopt, publish, and discuss honest long-term performance 
metrics, such as economic profit and return on invested capital, in lieu of popular fixations 
such as earning per share. Track these not by quarter or year but over a management 
team’s tenure or company’s life, even if that means decades of cumulative comparative 
data. Such steps will likewise repel transients and attract QS.  
   Above all, companies can make a conscious commitment to what QSs value most: 
effective capital allocation. This refers to a simple but elusive idea that treats every 




debt reduction, dividends or share buybacks. Finally, and related, companies can be 
prepared to rearrange corporate assets, and the equity they represent, through 
transactions designed to enable businesses to realize their potential value, such as 
through tracking stocks and spin-offs. These steps can redirect transient shareholders, 
liberate companies from the indexes and indexers, and deter activist interest.    
A. Highlights of Specific Levers 
 
 Concerning specific corporate policies or practices, we related publicly available 
data on various company practices to the QS density ranking of 2,070 companies based 
on their relative proportion of QSs (the “QSDR”). Levers include moats such as brand 
stewardship, business philosophy, shareholder communications in annual letters and 
meetings, economic profit, capital allocation, corporate governance, executive 
compensation and shareholder voting.  The data suggest an association between such 
company practices and attracting a high density of quality shareholders.  
Specifically, focus is on the percentage of companies following (or not following) a 
given practice that appear high (or low) in the QSDR. For example, no association can 
be asserted if companies following (or not following) a given practice are evenly or 
haphazardly distributed across the 2,070 companies in the QSDR; but if the practice 
group members skew mostly towards the high (say half are in the top 10%) or low end of 
the pool, such an association can be asserted.    
1. Competitive Advantages (Moats) 
 
 Companies that attract a high density of QSs tend to boast competitive advantages 
that protect business performance against a variety of threats.  Often referred to as moats, 
these include economies of scale, credence value, intellectual property, network effects, 
distribution systems, and brand strength. Morningstar publishes a list of some 500 
companies regarded as having among the strongest moats, 200 of which are in the QSDR 
database. Of those 200 companies common to both, one-third are in the top 10% of the 
QSDR; two-thirds are in the top 25%; and the overwhelming majority—nearly 90%—are 
























   There is a strong association between managers regarded as the best 
stewards of great brands and QS density rankings. Among US managers 
ranked in the global elite for brand guardianship, a total of 38 executives, all 
but one rank in the top half of attracting QS.  The table below lists a sampling 
of a dozen select leaders on the combined list.17 
 
 














2. Philosophy: Principles, Purpose, Mission   
 Philosophical positions on business abound. There are a variety of managerial 
principles, statements of business purpose and various conceptions of corporate mission. 
While talk is cheap, it is not necessarily meaningless. An association appears between 
various formulations of business philosophy and a high density of QS. Following are 
examples, followed by a caveat with a sampling of strong mission statements.   
 
   Johnson & Johnson minted in 1943 what’s now a classic statement of “corporate 
purpose.” It was the model for a statement adopted in 2019 by the Business 
Roundtable, a leading group of chief executives of large U.S. companies. The 
statement stresses the importance of customers and employees in generating 
shareholder value.  There is a strong association between those signatory 
companies and QS density. This suggests a strong association between the 











   The Drucker Institute advocates for the management leadership principles 
associated with its namesake, management professor Peter Drucker. These are 
statistically rigorous measures of customer satisfaction, employee engagement. 
Innovation, social responsibility and financial strength. The Drucker Institute 
annually applies these principles to rank the companies in the S&P 500 based. 
There is a strong association between companies ranked high by the Drucker 
Institute and QS density.19 
   
 
    Clever rhetoric and empty slogans are ineffective in mission statements. Equally 
unhelpful are general aspirations shared by rivals that fail to stand out. Table 4 
presents examples of strong mission statements.20 The strong examples are from 
companies ranking high for QS density.21    
   
Strong Mission Statements 
“To bring inspiration and innovation to every athlete in the world. If you have a body, 
you are an athlete.”—Nike (stresses product effects on customer experience)  
“Helping people on their path to better health.” –CVS (credible from the chain that 
ceased selling cigarettes, despite profitability) 
“Creating happiness through magical experiences.” —Walt Disney (employees and 
shareholders alike love this and it’s true) 
“To be a company that inspires and fulfills your curiosity.”  —Sony (inspired) 
“To make our cars better, our employees happier and our planet a better place to be.” 
—Ford Motor Co. (almost sounds like Henry Ford speaking to rally his start-up) 
 “We fulfill dreams of personal freedom.” —Harley Davidson (evokes the product and 
customer experience) 
 
3. Annual Letters to Shareholders  
 
 One expert on corporate shareholder letters, Laura Rittenhouse, stresses 
that reading the best letters can “boost your strategic IQ and your investment 
returns.” In a recent annual ranking, Rittenhouse designated the top 25 by her 
measures, the vast majority of which rank among the highest in terms of attracting 
QS.22      
  
 





























4. Annual Meetings of Shareholders  
 The history of annual shareholder meetings since the early 20th century reveals 
both their appeal and some drawbacks. Such gatherings began to go virtual in the first 
decade of the 21st century, with all held that way during the pandemic of 2020.  While 
people passionately debate the relative appeal of the live versus virtual meeting, the 
format did not appear to influence the attractiveness of a company to QSs.      
 
  Notably, the companies that went forward with virtual-only meetings despite 
criticism tend to enjoy a relatively higher QS density than those who retained live 
meetings under protest. Among those adhering to live meetings are several in the 
top quarter in attracting QSs: Conoco Phillips, Symantec and Union Pacific. Among 
those who went virtual yet remain adept at attracting QSs: Comcast, Duke Energy, 
Intel, and PayPal.23   
  
 5.  Shareholder Perks   
  A continuing infatuation with quarterly conference calls and earnings forecasts 
grips the investment community. But there are many ways for managers to maintain 
contact with shareholders throughout the year. One example is offering them discounts 
on company products or other rewards, such as additional shares for stock held for long 






  Companies can stay in touch with shareholders year-round—and 
commemorate the contact at the annual meeting—by offering perks. Rewards tend 
to be gifts of company products or price discounts. As such, they tend to attract 
individual shareholders, particularly those with smaller stakes, rather than 
institutions.  Empirical research indicates that companies adopting rewards 
programs gain significant shifts in their shareholder lists from institutions to 
individuals.24  Data as well as logic suggest that developing brand affinity entices 
them to stick around and support the company.25  Among companies boasting high 
QS density, a number offer such shareholder perquisites.26 
 
 
6. Economic Profit 
 QSs appear to appreciate clear, consistent and useful financial information. They 
seem to value concepts such as return on invested capital and economic profit.  The latter 
adjusts accounting income (whether GAAP or IFRS) by subtracting a cost for equity 









  Companies that take economic profit seriously tend to attract QS. Besides 
Coca-Cola and Credit Acceptance, these companies include Clorox, Crown 
Holdings, International Flavors, and Lear Corporation.27  
 
  
7. Capital Allocation 
  Capital allocation—how corporate dollars are invested—is critical both to corporate 
prosperity and attracting QS.     
  
     
CEOs should understand capital allocation. QSs are attracted to those who do.28   
 
   
 
8. Corporate Governance 
  Corporate governance debates rage concerning board composition and practices. 
Prevailing conventions are often challenged on logical and empirical grounds—which 
QSs appear to embrace.    
 
   Many corporations thrive when led by an outstanding person serving as both 
chairman and chief executive just as others have failed when the roles are split—
such as at Enron. Companies are about evenly divided on the practice: about half 
the S&P 500 split the functions while the other half combine them. QSs appear to 
think about this case-by-case and, if anything, slightly favor companies that combine 
rather than split the functions.29 
 
  
  On staggered boards, proponents stress advantages such as continuity and 
institutional knowledge while critics cite insulation from accountability. But answers 
to such issues require context. Some evidence indicates that staggered boards add 
value.30 Companies continue to be divided on the right approach.31 What’s clear is 
that ISS favors regimentation over context on this issue and many others where 















9. Executive Pay 
  
    [Our research] revealed approximately 250 top executives among all SEC 
registrants drawing a nominal (typically $1) salary for at least one year over the past 
decade. The pool falls below 35 when limited to companies appearing on the annual 
entry at least five times.   The smaller pool boasts a few companies scoring high 
in QS density, including Expedia, National Instruments, and Post Holdings. 
However, probably reflecting the many and varied reasons for joining the one-dollar 
club, the distribution of companies does not support concluding that nominal 
executive salaries are associated with higher QS densities.32   
 
 10. Shareholder Voting 
 While corporate tradition provides shareholders with one-vote-per-share, 
alternative shareholder voting rules abound. Examples include dual class structures 
giving different votes-per-share to different classes, as well as time-weighted voting, 
more votes to longer-held shares.  The importance of QSs warrants considering “quality 
voting”—more votes to longer-held shares owned by concentrated shareholders). A few 
empirical points appear.  
 
   Given the wide variety of approaches to shareholder voting, QSs examine 
dual class structures on a case-by-case basis. Among companies with dual class 
structures are a substantial cohort with high QS density.33 The following table is a 





Dual Class Capital Structures and QS Density 
Aflac     
Berkshire Hathaway 
Brown-Forman   
Constellation Brands    
Discovery Comm.   
DISH Network  
Erie Indemnity   
Estee Lauder Companies 
John Wiley & Sons   
Expedia   
Graham Holdings  
Hyatt Hotels     





New York Times Co. 













    Empirical evidence on the effects of time-weighted voting is limited.34 Only 
a handful of U.S. companies currently maintain time-weighted voting: Aflac, Carlisle, 
J.M. Smucker, Quaker Chemical, and Synovus Financial. A few others once 
employed time-weighted voting but have since rescinded it: CenturyTel, Church & 
Dwight, Cincinnati Milacron, Roper, and Shaw Group. Despite the small sample 
size, all such companies that have experimented with time-weighted voting rank 
high in terms of attracting QSs.35    
  
 
11. Stock Split Aversion 
 While there are sometimes substantive reasons to split a high-priced stock (to 
facilitate shareholder gift-giving or pay for an acquisition) some companies split mainly to 
cut share price or sway shareholder views. QSs prize managerial focus on business 
performance rather than stock price levels. They tend to be attracted more to companies 
that avoid stock splits and whose stock price rises accordingly.    
           AutoZone [share price ~$1,100], an automotive parts retailer, counts among 
sizable QSs: AllianceBernstein, Burgundy Asset Management, First Manhattan, and 
Tweedy Browne. 
         Booking [~$1,700], a travel fare aggregator and search engine, formerly 
known as priceline.com, has not split its stock since 1998. Its long list of QSs 
includes: Capital Research Global Investors, Dodge & Cox, Edgewood 
Management, Fidelity, and Harris Associates. 
 NVR [~$4,000] is a homebuilder and mortgage banker whose shares grew 
ten-fold in the decade before the housing bubble burst. The shares remain pricey 
and the stock has never been split since its 1940 debut. Marquee QSs include: 
Diamond Hill Capital, Smead Capital, and Wellington. 
 Seaboard [~$2,800] is a $6 billion (annual revenue) conglomerate 77% 
owned by the Bresky family. The stock has never been split since its 1959 launch 
and turnover is extremely low. Its recent trading price is low by historic standards. 
Notable QSs: First Saberpoint Capital, Khan Brothers, and Knightsbridge Asset 
Management.  
 Cable One [~$1,700] is a broadband communications company spun off in 
2015 from Graham Holdings (successor to The Washington Post Co.). QSs include: 
Capital International Investors, D. F. Dent, Neuberger Berman, Rothschild & Co., 










B. Summary of Specific Levers  
 The following table summarizes the statistical basis for the specific levers identified 
by the Quality Shareholders Initiative as being associated with a high density of QS.   
 
 
   
 
    
 
    
Nominal Variables  N= 
 
 
Number Within QSDR  Percent Within QSDR   
 Top 10% Top 25% Top 50%  Top 10% Top 25% Top 50%  
 Branding  36 
 
 13 27 35 
 36% 75% 97%  
 Moat  202   65 127 180  32% 62% 87%  
 Chair-CEO  234 
 
 66 132 197 
 28% 56% 84%  
 Drucker  141 
 
 39 76 119 
 28% 54% 84%  
 Value CEO  140   37 79 105  26% 56% 75%  
 Bus. R. Table  135 
 
 34 74 109 
 25% 55% 81%  
 Split-Chair  216 
 
 37 92 184 
 17% 43% 85%  
 Dual Class  135 
 
 15 41 86 
 11% 30% 64%  
 Low Pay  22 
 
 2 6 14 
 9% 27% 64%  
 
V. FURTHER RESEARCH 
 It is possible that not all QSs behave in a similar way.  Might it be that there are 
two different kinds of QS?  Might some exercise their position for positive corporate good 
while others do so to extract private gain?  Skimming the lists of top and bottom 
performers with high QS density, what is the exact makeup and behavior of this cohort?  
Consider inside ownership by a single executive and his/her family versus other forms of 
QSs such as insurance companies or mutual funds. In other words, not all long-term high 
conviction (“LTHC”) shareholders are QSs.   
 Some LTHC’s exert influence or control to benefit themselves at the expense of 
other shareholders. Research could examine the effects of high levels of inside ownership 
or the presence of controlling shareholders on both relative QS density and relative 
corporate performance. If so, under the QS rubric, the designation of QS would be 
retained for the symbiont portion of the LTHC quadrant, while calling out the parasitic 
portion of the quadrant and specifically excluding them. (Consider it the inverse of the 




 In addition, further tools and techniques can be refined to deal with some of the 
definitional challenges of Quality Shareholders. Despite taking care to delineate a range 
of metrics probing conviction, gaps may remain—for instance, concentration is almost 
certainly an imprecise measure of conviction. Consider two reciprocal examples of the 
problem from real world settings.  
 First, a mutual fund family might seed a dozen funds, each heavily concentrated 
(say 5-10 stocks); a few years on, some of these naturally outperform without effort and 
fund markets these to attract AUM. This might pass most statistical definitions for the 
conviction aspect of QS, but it is the fund family’s behavior is inconsistent with the 
philosophy or reasons for empowering certain shareholders. Such strategies could even 
be used as a subterfuge to game the system.   
 Empirical research could continue to refine the definitions or develop or other tools 
to distinguish genuine QS from such phantom QS. Policy and practice research could do 
so by drafting language for charter provisions that express the purpose of QS 
empowerment, defines terms accordingly.  Language would then put the burden of 
persuasion on the shareholder wishing to exercise associated rights to prove eligibility to 
the corporation’s satisfaction, that it is a genuine QS rather than a strategic artifact or 
subterfuge.  
 For the reciprocal case, some institutional investors employ high conviction 
managers who would be QSs but also impose limits on permissive positions. Forced sales 
can result to reduce average holding periods or concentration thresholds, though not the 
manager’s conviction. Such effects might disqualify such shareholders from exercising 
QS rights, though they may be expected to exercise those rights more suitably than fellow 
shareholders who met the numerical QS thresholds.  For theory, this is less worrisome in 
a sense because they almost entirely ceased to be shareholders for whatever reason; for 
practice, research might investigate whether corporations offering additional rights in such 
settings might, as a matter of theory or practice, induce such funds to alter their 
restrictions. 
 Further research could contract the scope to consider whether particular industries 




in other leading industrial countries, such as France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the 
United Kingdom.   
 Research into the policies and practices that may attract or repel different 
shareholder types remains of great ongoing interest. For instance, we are investigating 
the correlation between QS density and various measures of competitive advantage and 
of insider share ownership. Similarly, refinements can be made in the scope of the 
definition of QS. For instance, we are examining the degree to which various shareholders 
vote on corporate resolutions based on their own independent judgment as compared 
with reliance upon the recommendations of institutional investor proxy advisers such as 
ISS or Glass Lewis.  
 Performance results and implications warrant continued examination. Our initial 
research is the product of hindsight. A more convincing test would be longitudinal. A 
research proposal that Cunningham and the Initiative aim to implement: construct a 
portfolio of high QS density investments, chosen ex ante, with performance results to be 
isolated and reported five years hence.  
 In constructing such a portfolio, in addition to fundamental analysis, it is worth 
trying to determine whether any of the various levers noted earlier are more (or less) 
frequently used by the top (and bottom) performers. If so, portfolio design could be 
weighted in favor of companies applying such levers.  
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